this is great, and overlaps which lots that i also think about. i’ve also shared the desire for increased reduction of policy questions to ‘data questions’, however i think this does brush over the fact that the question you consider, as almost any political disagreement, also roots itself in a particular moral framework (what is ‘should’, what is ‘best’), and unless you all agree on an ethics, and it’a neat and calculationary one (and perhaps not even then!), this reduction doesn’t obviously get you any closer to a framework for assessing true agreement/disagreement, or perhaps truth itself. this comes up perhaps most commonly when party politicians in moments of difficulty will proclaim that all the main parties ‘share the same goals’ — those goals presumably being making britain a better place for everyone to live in. asides from the fact that even this statement is obviously factually incorrect, the fact that a politician could sincerely believe that would seem to suggest all politics should reduce to the simple calculation of what’s best, which is never seems to.
the other objection of course, and commonly applied to utilitarian arguments, is that the supposed data questions to which we’re in the business of reducing things don’t have knowable answers (in the form eg of clear truth criteria) — is it 67% bad to make put someones safety at risk in a particular situation or is it 68%?
i’m not totally swayed by these objections and sometimes approximations will be good enough, and in general i think in any case the thrust of ‘people should be significantly more precise on exactly what they disagree on when they disagree’ is something i believe very strongly, i just think perhaps just hoping this can always become a ‘data question’, or that doing so will solve things, is overoptimistic
The story of Edshu - the god who walked down a road with a hat half red and half blue - some in the village saw the red side, others th eblue and everyone started fighting about the colour of the hat
fundamental attribution error or correspondence bias—of people’s motivations in seeing their actions as explained by stable character traits and deep psychological dispositions or motivations, rather than much more powerful situational factors
I for my part hold the very opposite opinion, and I assert that whenever a dispute has raged for any length of time, espe- cially in philosophy, there was, at the bottom of it, never a problem about mere words, but always a genuine problem about things.
George Eliot - on cognitive dissonace/ disagreement - We have all of us considerable regard for our past self, and are not fond of casting reflections on that respected individual by a total negation of his opinions.
the centre for applied rationality - workshops on how to have productive and goalpost shifting by establishing facts and framing conversations as science-based instead of adversarial
Coddling of the American Mind - When serious thinkers respect someone, they are willing to engage them in a thoughtful argument. Grant offers the following four rules for productive disagreement: Frame it as a debate, rather than a conflict. Argue as if you’re right, but listen as if you’re wrong (and be willing to change your mind). Make the most respectful interpretation of the other person’s perspective. Acknowledge where you agree with your critics and what you’ve learned from them.
If there is a historical element of disagreement, would you be able to predict a balance of beliefs? is it the case that 10% of people are always destined to be a maverick/ you could predict if someone would be a maverick or not merely by ref. to majority or not thinking? and if people are seperate then what is the case there?
Which of the three great allies, the U.S.S.R., Britain and the USA, has contributed most to the defeat of Germany? In theory, it should be possible to give a reasoned and perhaps even a conclusive answer to this question. In practice, however, the necessary calculations cannot be made, because anyone likely to bother his head about such a question would inevitably see it in terms of competitive prestige. He would therefore start by deciding in favour of Russia, Britain or America as the case might be, and only after this would begin searching for arguments that seemed to support his case. . - Orwell on nationalism
this is great, and overlaps which lots that i also think about. i’ve also shared the desire for increased reduction of policy questions to ‘data questions’, however i think this does brush over the fact that the question you consider, as almost any political disagreement, also roots itself in a particular moral framework (what is ‘should’, what is ‘best’), and unless you all agree on an ethics, and it’a neat and calculationary one (and perhaps not even then!), this reduction doesn’t obviously get you any closer to a framework for assessing true agreement/disagreement, or perhaps truth itself. this comes up perhaps most commonly when party politicians in moments of difficulty will proclaim that all the main parties ‘share the same goals’ — those goals presumably being making britain a better place for everyone to live in. asides from the fact that even this statement is obviously factually incorrect, the fact that a politician could sincerely believe that would seem to suggest all politics should reduce to the simple calculation of what’s best, which is never seems to.
the other objection of course, and commonly applied to utilitarian arguments, is that the supposed data questions to which we’re in the business of reducing things don’t have knowable answers (in the form eg of clear truth criteria) — is it 67% bad to make put someones safety at risk in a particular situation or is it 68%?
i’m not totally swayed by these objections and sometimes approximations will be good enough, and in general i think in any case the thrust of ‘people should be significantly more precise on exactly what they disagree on when they disagree’ is something i believe very strongly, i just think perhaps just hoping this can always become a ‘data question’, or that doing so will solve things, is overoptimistic
The story of Edshu - the god who walked down a road with a hat half red and half blue - some in the village saw the red side, others th eblue and everyone started fighting about the colour of the hat
Gallie 1956 - essentially contested concepts
if we want to suggest a particular disagreement is meaningful generally means there is some idea of what it is to be right/ wrong
fundamental attribution error or correspondence bias—of people’s motivations in seeing their actions as explained by stable character traits and deep psychological dispositions or motivations, rather than much more powerful situational factors
I for my part hold the very opposite opinion, and I assert that whenever a dispute has raged for any length of time, espe- cially in philosophy, there was, at the bottom of it, never a problem about mere words, but always a genuine problem about things.
I. Kant (1786)
George Eliot - on cognitive dissonace/ disagreement - We have all of us considerable regard for our past self, and are not fond of casting reflections on that respected individual by a total negation of his opinions.
In science there are no ‘depths’; there is surface everywhere: all experience forms a complex
network, which cannot always be surveyed and, can often be grasped only in parts.’
https://paulgraham.com/disagree.html
the centre for applied rationality - workshops on how to have productive and goalpost shifting by establishing facts and framing conversations as science-based instead of adversarial
Coddling of the American Mind - When serious thinkers respect someone, they are willing to engage them in a thoughtful argument. Grant offers the following four rules for productive disagreement: Frame it as a debate, rather than a conflict. Argue as if you’re right, but listen as if you’re wrong (and be willing to change your mind). Make the most respectful interpretation of the other person’s perspective. Acknowledge where you agree with your critics and what you’ve learned from them.
If there is a historical element of disagreement, would you be able to predict a balance of beliefs? is it the case that 10% of people are always destined to be a maverick/ you could predict if someone would be a maverick or not merely by ref. to majority or not thinking? and if people are seperate then what is the case there?
Which of the three great allies, the U.S.S.R., Britain and the USA, has contributed most to the defeat of Germany? In theory, it should be possible to give a reasoned and perhaps even a conclusive answer to this question. In practice, however, the necessary calculations cannot be made, because anyone likely to bother his head about such a question would inevitably see it in terms of competitive prestige. He would therefore start by deciding in favour of Russia, Britain or America as the case might be, and only after this would begin searching for arguments that seemed to support his case. . - Orwell on nationalism
https://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Research_files/aoz009%20%281%29.pdf
https://dynalist.io/d/pgngbu6nDQbQzu1Gcof3Dj1i